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CODIFY THIS: EXCULPATORY CONTRACTS
IN WISCONSIN RECREATIONAL
BUSINESSES
It is common practice for recreational businesses, such as ski resorts or
fitness centers, to require their customers to sign a release of liability form.
The purpose of this release form is to relieve the business from any potential
liability in the event a customer suffers an injury. However, since 1982, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court has yet to uphold an exculpatory contract. Rather
than attempting to lay out principles and guidelines for how to draft an
exculpatory agreement—in hopes that it will be ruled enforceable—this
Comment proposes that Wisconsin recreational businesses, like ski resorts or
gyms, should not require customers to sign a release of liability form.
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INTRODUCTION

When consumers decide to hit the slopes or sign up for that new gym
membership when the New Year hits, more often than not, they are required to
sign a release of liability form. A release form, i.e., exculpatory contract, is a
“contract in which one party agrees to release . . . another from potential tort
liability for future conduct covered in the agreement.”1 Businesses will rely on
these release forms in order to limit their exposure to lawsuits.2 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court defines exculpatory contracts as “contracts which relieve a
party from liability for harm caused by his or her own negligence.”3 Examining
the cases heard before the Wisconsin Supreme Court regarding exculpatory
contracts, the following three main principles have been cited when
determining the validity of exculpatory contracts: (1) “[exculpatory] contracts
are not favored by the law”;4 (2) an exculpatory clause must “be construed
strictly against the party seeking to rely on [it]”;5 and (3) courts will “examine
the facts and circumstances of each exculpatory contract with special care to
determine whether enforcement of the exculpatory contract in the individual
case contravenes public policy.”6 These three principles represent the
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s attempt to balance both principles of contract and
tort law.7

1. Mary Ann Connell & Frederick G. Savage, Releases: Is There Still a Place for Their Use by
Colleges and Universities?, 29 J.C. & U.L. 579, 580 (2003).
2. Keith Bruett, Can Wisconsin Businesses Safely Rely upon Exculpatory Contracts to Limit
Their Liability?, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 1081, 1081 (1998).
3. Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 210, 321 N.W.2d 173, 176 (1982).
4. Id. at 210–11; Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 81, 557 N.W.2d 60, 62 (1996);
Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1015, 513 N.W.2d 118, 121 (1994); accord Roberts v. T.H.E.
Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, ¶ 48, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492; Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness
Ctr., 2005 WI 4, ¶ 12, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334; Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wis. 2d 502, 514,
468 N.W.2d 654, 658 (1991); Disc. Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. Wis. Tel. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 587,
600, 345 N.W.2d 417, 423 (1984) (quoting Pride v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 138 S.E.2d 155, 157 (S.C.
1964)); Arnold v. Shawano Cty. Agric. Socʹy, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 209, 330 N.W.2d 773, 777 (1983),
overruled on other grounds by Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 401 N.W.2d 816
(1987). The rationale behind why exculpatory contracts are not favored by the law is “because
exculpatory contracts tend to allow conduct . . . below the acceptable standard of ordinary and
reasonable care.” Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 514.
5. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 211; accord Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 48; Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶ 12;
Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1015; Disc. Fabric House of Racine, 117 Wis. 2d at 600; Arnold, 111 Wis.
2d at 209.
6. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 211.
7. Id. at 212; Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶ 14; Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1016; Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at
514–15.
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Despite the fact that courts attempt to strike a balance between principles
of contract law and tort law,8 the Wisconsin Supreme Court, since 1982, has
considered the validity of an exculpatory contract in a total of eight cases, and
has—in all eight cases—held each exculpatory contract unenforceable.9 And
while the holdings have been consistent, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s
analysis regarding the enforceability of exculpatory contracts has evolved.10
This makes it extremely difficult for businesses to prevail and convince the
Wisconsin Supreme Court (or any circuit court under it for that matter) to find
the exculpatory contract enforceable.
Given the uphill battle in attempting to convince the Wisconsin Supreme
Court to uphold an exculpatory contract, this Comment argues that Wisconsin
recreational businesses should not require their customers to sign a release of
liability form because: (a) Wisconsin case law does not favor exculpatory
contracts; and (b) various Wisconsin statutes offer immunity/protection to those
who fulfill their duties under the applicable statute.
This Comment proceeds as follows. Part II examines the Wisconsin
Supreme Court’s analysis of exculpatory contracts under both contract law and
public policy grounds. I also establish a timeline mapping out exactly how the
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s analysis has evolved. In Part III, I discuss Roberts
v. T.H.E. Insurance Company, a case recently decided by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court.11 Additionally, I analyze the exculpatory language found in a
gym membership agreement located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and apply the
analysis the Wisconsin Supreme Court undertook in Roberts. Specifically, I
demonstrate just how difficult it is for businesses to prevail when relying on an
exculpatory contract, given the current analysis undertaken by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. I then assess whether or not a court would find the exculpatory
language enforceable. Part IV examines a specific Wisconsin statute that
affords ski resorts protection, and thus, eliminates a need for customers to sign
a release of liability form. I also briefly return to Roberts v. T.H.E. Insurance
Company, which supports the notion that an exculpatory contract is not needed
8. See Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶ 14; Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1016; Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 514–15;
Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 212.
9. See Alexander T. Pendleton, Enforceable Exculpatory Agreements: Do They Still Exist?, WIS.
LAW., Aug. 2005, at 17; see also Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 4; Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶ 2; Yauger, 206 Wis.
2d at 89; Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1020; Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 526; Disc. Fabric House of Racine,
117 Wis. 2d at 604; Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 214; Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 215.
10. See Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 86 (recognizing that earlier cases had resolved the issue based on
contract but determined that public policy is actually the “germane analysis”); Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶ 13
(confirming that public policy is the “germane analysis”).
11. 2016 WI 20.
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when a business is afforded statutory protection.12 Finally, Part V sets forth a
proposal that would eliminate the need for recreational businesses in Wisconsin
to require their customers to sign a release of liability form.
II. TIMELINE OF THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS OF
EXCULPATORY CONTRACTS
In this Part, I examine the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s analysis of
exculpatory contracts under both contract law and public policy grounds, while
establishing a timeline that lays out exactly how the court’s analysis has
evolved. Historically, exculpatory contracts have been analyzed under both
principles of contract law and public policy grounds.13 However, recent cases
decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court have not emphasized the contractual
analysis and have claimed that public policy is the germane analysis.14
Nonetheless, the court will still conduct its analysis under principles of contract
law if needed.15
A. Historical Approach: Exculpatory Contracts Analyzed Under
Principles of Contract Law and Public Policy (1965–1994)
From 1965 to 1994, the Wisconsin Supreme Court analyzed exculpatory
contracts under both a contractual basis and public policy.16 However, the
analysis undertaken using principles of contract law versus the analysis
undertaken using public policy is distinguishable.17 In order to differentiate
between the two, it is helpful to examine exculpatory contracts resolved under
either (i) principles of contract law or (ii) public policy.
1. Exculpatory Contracts Resolved under Principles of Contract Law
When an exculpatory contract is enforceable under public policy grounds,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court will “look to the contract itself to consider its

12. See id. ¶ 47.
13. See Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 86.
14. Id.; Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 49.
15. See Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 50; Arnold v. Shawano Cty. Agric. Socʹy, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 211,
330 N.W.2d 773, 777 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis.
2d 304, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).
16. See Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1011, 513 N.W.2d 118, 119 (1994); Dobratz v.
Thomson, 161 Wis. 2d 502, 506–07, 468 N.W.2d 654, 655 (1991); Disc. Fabric House of Racine, Inc.
v. Wis. Tel. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 587, 600, 345 N.W.2d 417, 423 (1984); Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 210–11;
Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 206, 321 N.W.2d 173, 174 (1982).
17. See Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 214–15.
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validity” under contract principles.18 The court will examine the facts and
circumstances of each case to determine whether the contract expresses the
intent of the parties.19 If in fact the contract fails to express the intent of the
parties, the court will not enforce the exculpatory agreement.20 Perhaps even
more significant, the Wisconsin Supreme Court disfavors any exculpatory
agreement that is broad and general in terms and will only bar “claims that are
within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was executed.”21 In
order to shed some light on these principles, the following paragraphs illustrate
the two leading exculpatory contract cases analyzed under principles of contract
law decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
In Arnold v. Shawano County Agricultural Society, racecar driver Leroy
Arnold and his wife, Karen Arnold, sued Shawano County Agricultural Society,
Shawano County, and the Shawano County Fair Board (track owners and race
promoters), seeking to recover damages for the severe brain damage and
personal injuries that Mr. Arnold sustained as a result of the accident.22 The
defendants moved for summary judgment, pointing to an exculpatory contract
signed by Mr. Arnold.23 In its analysis, the Wisconsin Supreme Court first
looked to public policy.24 After determining the exculpatory contract was not
invalid under public policy grounds, the court then looked to the contract itself
to determine its validity.25
Looking at the facts and circumstances of the agreement in order to
determine whether the exculpatory contract expressed the intent of the parties,26
the court stated, “[t]he determination of intent of the parties to a release, and

18. Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 520 (quoting Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 211). Dobratz paved the way
in terms of exculpatory agreements being analyzed under principles of contract. See, e.g., Richards,
181 Wis. 2d at 1014.
19. Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 211; Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 520.
20. Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 211. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Dobratz framed the issue in
the following manner: “[T]his court must determine whether the claim being made by the plaintiff was
clearly within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was executed. Only if it is apparent
that the parties . . . knowingly agreed to excuse the defendants from liability will the contract be
enforceable.” Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 520 (citation omitted).
21. Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 211 (citations omitted); accord Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 520. In
Dobratz, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reiterated the fact that “the court will closely scrutinize an
exculpatory contract and construe it strictly against the defendants.” Id.
22. Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 204–05.
23. Id. at 206–07.
24. See id. at 210–11.
25. Id. at 211 (examining two cases that resolved an exculpatory contract issue under public
policy before moving on to contract law).
26. Id.
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the scope of a release, is a question of fact for the jury.”27 Looking at Karen
Arnold’s affidavit, the court noted that Mrs. Arnold in fact alleged not that her
husband’s injuries were caused by the accident, but rather by the spraying of
toxic chemicals during the rescue mission.28 Examining the contract itself, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court found that “an issue of material fact exists as to
whether the risk of negligent rescue operations was within the contemplation
of the parties at the time the exculpatory contract was executed,” and therefore
appropriate for the trier of fact to decide.29 Specifically, the exculpatory
contract stated that it covered “any loss, liability or damages whether caused by
the negligence of releasees or otherwise.”30 As a result, the court concluded
that, even though an attempt was made to construct an all-inclusive contract,
the exculpatory contract was ambiguous.31 Thus, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the exculpatory contract did not bar
the claims.32
Eight years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court examined and resolved
another exculpatory contract under principles of contract law.33 In Dobratz v.
Thomson, Mark Dobratz, a member of a water ski show, was struck and killed
by a boat during one of the shows.34 Brenda Dobratz, Mark Dobratz’s widow,
filed negligence claims against club officers, various members who participated
in the show, and the driver of the boat that struck him.35 The defendants moved
for summary judgment, claiming the exculpatory contract signed by Mark
Dobratz barred the claims.36 Brenda Dobratz argued that the terms of the
contract were unclear and ambiguous such that the exculpatory contract should
be rendered unenforceable as a matter of law.37
Following the blueprint in Arnold, the Wisconsin Supreme Court first
looked to public policy.38 The court here found that the contract was not void

27. Id. at 212.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. (footnote omitted).
31. Id. at 214.
32. See id. at 215.
33. See Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wis. 2d 502, 468 N.W.2d 654 (1991).
34. Id. at 507–08.
35. Id. at 508. Neither the club nor the insurance carrier was named in the suit because it did not
carry any applicable insurance; however, the individual defendants’ insurers were joined as parties.
Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 520.
38. Id. at 515.
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on public policy grounds, and therefore looked to the contract itself.39 Similar
to Arnold, the court held that provisions of the contract at issue here were broad
and general.40 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned that, “[l]ike the contract
in Arnold, this contract did not ‘set out any particular conditions concerning the
nature of [the activity] and the [location] where it [was] to take place.’”41 More
specifically, the exculpatory contract did not specify the kind of stunts Mr.
Dobratz would perform, what level of difficulty or danger might be associated
with the stunts, and no information regarding these concerns was provided to
Mr. Dobratz prior to signing.42
However, distinguishable from Arnold, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that, as a matter of law, an exculpatory contract never existed.43 As a result,
unlike Arnold, the trier of fact did not need to determine whether an exculpatory
contract existed in the first place.44 Additionally, in an attempt to offer guidance
when drafting exculpatory contracts, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
[A]lthough we do not intend to create a “magic words” rule,
we consider that it would be very helpful for such contracts to
set forth in clear and express terms that the party signing it is
releasing others for their negligent acts or, where the contract
includes an assumption of risk clause, is assuming the risk of
harm caused by the negligent acts of others.45
While some may have taken this advice when drafting exculpatory contracts, it
will become evident that heeding this advice is by no means a sure thing.
2. Exculpatory Contracts Resolved under Public Policy
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin recognizes that public policy is not an
easily-defined concept.46 The concept “embodies the community common

39. Id. at 519–20. The court here stated, “In Arnold, we indicated that where an exculpatory
contract is not void and unenforceable on public policy grounds[] [w]e . . . must look to the contract
itself.” Id. at 520 (quoting Arnold v. Shawano Cty. Agric. Socʹy, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 211, 330 N.W.2d
773, 777 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 401
N.W.2d 816 (1987)).
40. Id. at 522.
41. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 211).
42. Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 522.
43. Id. at 523.
44. See id. Therefore, unlike Arnold, it was not necessary “for the trial court to determine
whether in fact there existed an exculpatory contract even though [the court] could not find an
enforceable exculpatory contract as a matter of law.” Id.
45. Id. at 525.
46. Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 213, 321 N.W.2d 173, 178 (1982).
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sense and common conscience.”47 In order to determine whether an
exculpatory contract violates public policy, the court must look at the facts and
circumstances of each case.48 In determining the validity of an exculpatory
contract under public policy, the Wisconsin Supreme Court attempts to balance
“the tension between principles of contract law and tort law inherent in any
exculpatory contract.”49
Principles of contract law justify exculpatory contracts.50 The law of
contract is based on the key fundamental principle of freedom of contract and
that individuals should have the opportunity to “govern their own affairs
without governmental interference.”51 Moreover, “[f]reedom of contract
requires that [individuals who] engage in the bargaining process [do so] ‘freely
and voluntarily.’”52 Each party is then protected by the courts, which ensure
that the promises will be performed.53 One scholar has pointed to the
importance of freedom of contract by citing the United States Supreme Court,
which stated:
If there is one thing which more than another public policy
requires it is that men of full age and competent understanding
shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their
contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be
held sacred, and shall be enforced by courts of justice.54
On the other hand, principles of tort law discourage the enforceability of
exculpatory contracts.55 “The law of torts is directed toward compensation of
individuals for injuries sustained as the result of the unreasonable conduct of
another.”56 Additionally, tort law “serves the ‘prophylactic’ purpose of

47. Id.
48. Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 514.
49. Id. at 515; accord Bruett, supra note 2, at 1083 (“Courts assessing the validity of exculpatory
clauses attempt to balance ‘the tension between the principles of contract and tort law that are inherent
in such [] agreement[s].’” (alterations in original) (quoting Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007,
1016, 513 N.W.2d 118, 121 (1994))).
50. See Bruett, supra note 2, at 1083.
51. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 211.
52. Bruett, supra note 2, at 1083 (quoting Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1016).
53. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 211.
54. Bruett, supra note 2, at 1083 (quoting Baltimore & Ohio S.W. R.R. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S.
498, 505 (1900)).
55. Id. at 1084.
56. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 211.
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preventing future harm.”57 Furthermore, payment of damages functions as an
incentive to act in accordance with a reasonable standard of care.58
Balancing the principles of contract and tort law, courts will find that an
exculpatory contract violates public policy when “the public policy ‘of
imposing liability on persons whose conduct creates an unreasonable risk of
harm’ outweighs the public policy of ‘freedom of contract.’”59 However, as
noted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in one of its earliest cases regarding
exculpatory contracts, the balancing is nothing short of a challenge. The court
stated:
Adherence to principles of contract law would generally
lead a court to enforce an exculpatory agreement without
passing on the substance of the agreement. Adherence to
principles of tort law would tend to make a court reluctant to
allow parties to shift by contract the burden of negligent
conduct from the actor to the victim who has no actual control
or responsibility for the conduct causing the injury. The rules
governing exculpatory contracts reflect the uneasy balance
between these principles of contract and tort law.60
Nevertheless, Wisconsin’s adoption of section 195 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts somewhat eliminated this difficulty in balancing.61
According to section 195 of the Restatement—concerning contractual terms
exempting liability for harm caused intentionally, recklessly, or negligently—
exculpatory contracts can be found unenforceable on grounds of public policy;
section 195 states:
(1) A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused
intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of
public policy.
(2) A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused
negligently is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if
(a) the term exempts an employer from liability to an
employee for injury in the course of his employment;
(b) the term exempts one charged with a duty of public
service from liability to one to whom that duty is owed for
compensation for breach of that duty, or

57. Id.
58. Id. at 211–12; Bruett, supra note 2, at 1084.
59. Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1016, 513 N.W.2d 118, 122 (1994) (quoting Merten,
108 Wis. 2d. at 215).
60. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 212 (footnote omitted).
61. See id.
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(c) the other party is similarly a member of a class protected
against the class to which the first party belongs.
(3) A term exempting a seller of a product from his special tort
liability for physical harm to a user or consumer is
unenforceable on grounds of public policy unless the term is
fairly bargained for and is consistent with the policy underlying
that liability.62
Additionally, Comment a of section 195 of the Restatement provides the
court with an out.63 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has noted that these
categories “are not intended as an exhaustive list of situations in which
exculpatory contracts are unenforceable on the grounds of public policy.”64 As
a result, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has the ability to craft its own rules and
factors for each case.65 To clarify the public policy analysis just explained, and
to demonstrate the court’s broad discretion, it may be helpful to illustrate a case
decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
In Richards v. Richards, Leo Richards, an “over-the-road truck driver” for
Monkem Company, and his wife, Jerilyn Richards, discussed the possibility of
her riding along as a passenger with him.66 However, before Mrs. Richards
could ride as a passenger, Monkem Company required her to sign a “Passenger
Authorization” form.67 The form not only served as the Company’s
authorization form for passengers to ride in a company truck, but it also served
as the passenger’s release of all claims against Monkem.68
While
accompanying her husband on one of his scheduled trips, the truck overturned,
injuring Mrs. Richards.69 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the
exculpatory language in Monkem’s Passenger Authorization form violated
public policy, and thus, was unenforceable.70 In reaching this conclusion, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin looked at a combination of three factors.71

62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
63. See id. § 195 cmt. a.
64. Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 213; see Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wis. 2d 502, 516, 468 N.W.2d
654, 659 (1991).
65. Bruett, supra note 2, at 1086; see, e.g., Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1016, 513
N.W.2d 118, 122 (1994) (applying three different factors).
66. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1011–12.
67. Id. at 1012.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1014.
70. Id. at 1020.
71. Id. at 1016.
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First, the court looked at the fact that the Passenger Authorization form
served a dual function and was not clearly identified.72 The court noted that, in
order to avoid confusion, the release form should have been clearly labeled and
distinguishable from the ride along form.73 Second, the release Mrs. Richards
signed was broad and all-inclusive.74 Courts have held that “[a]n exculpatory
agreement will be held to contravene public policy if it is so broad ‘that it would
absolve [the defendant] from any injury to the [plaintiff] for any reason.’”75 In
this case, the release excused “intentional, reckless, and negligent conduct” by
the Company, another entity, and all “affiliated, associated, or subsidiary
companies, partnerships, individuals, or corporations, and all other persons,
firms or corporations.”76 Additionally, the release was not limited to a specified
vehicle or for a specific period of time.77 Third, the contract was a standardized
agreement, which offered Mrs. Richards zero opportunity to negotiate or
bargain.78 The court reasoned that, “[h]ad [Mrs. Richards] been afforded the
opportunity to negotiate a release, she might have declined to release the
Company from liability.”79
Finally, the court balanced principles of contract law and tort law.80 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the combination of the three factors
demonstrated “that adherence to the principle of freedom of contract is not
heavily favored,” and thus, the principle of tort law prevailed.81 As a result, the
court held that the contract violated public policy, and was therefore
unenforceable.82

72. Id. at 1017. The form served as an authorization form for a passenger to ride along and as a
general release of liability form. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id. “The very breadth of the release raises questions about its meaning and demonstrates
its one-sidedness; it is unreasonably favorable to the Company, the drafter of the contract.” Id. at 1018.
75. Id. at 1015 (alterations in original) (quoting Coll. Mobile Home Park & Sales, Inc. v.
Hoffmann, 72 Wis. 2d 514, 521–22, 241 N.W.2d 174, 178 (1976)).
76. Id. at 1017–18.
77. Id. at 1018.
78. See id. at 1019 (reasoning that while the release was “printed in a standardized form,” this
alone did not invalidate the release; rather, Mrs. Richard’s lack of opportunity to bargain on top of the
breadth of the release lead to its invalidation).
79. Id. at 1020.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Id.
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B. Germane Analysis: A Shift to Public Policy (1996–2017)
Two years after Richards was decided, the Wisconsin Supreme Court took
up yet another exculpatory contracts case: Yauger v. Skiing Enterprises, Inc.83
In this case, Michael Yauger purchased a family ski pass.84 On the application
form, Yauger filled in the names of his daughters and wife.85 Immediately
below this information, the application contained the following exculpatory
clause at issue: “There are certain inherent risks in skiing and that we agree to
hold Hidden Valley Ski Area/Skiing Enterprises Inc. harmless on account of
any injury incurred by me or my [f]amily member on the Hidden Valley Ski
Area premises.”86 Later that ski season, Tara, one of Yauger’s daughters, was
skiing at Hidden Valley when she ran into a concrete base of a chair lift.87 The
Yaugers filed a negligence suit, claiming Hidden Valley failed to pad the
concrete base.88 After both the trial court and court of appeals held that the
exculpatory clause barred the Yaugers’ negligence claim, the case made its way
to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.89
In this landmark case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted its new
analysis regarding exculpatory contracts.90 The court recognized exculpatory
contracts were being resolved under both contract law and public policy91:
“Although we recognize that Dobratz and Arnold resolved the issue on a
contractual basis, Richards reached the same result, yet departed from the
contractual analysis and rested on public policy. We conclude that public
policy is the germane analysis.”92
Distinguishable from Richards, here the court looked at two factors to
support its holding that the exculpatory contract violated public policy: “First,
the waiver must clearly, unambiguously, and unmistakably inform the signer of
what is being waived. Second, the form, looked at in its entirety, must alert the
83. 206 Wis. 2d 76, 557 N.W.2d 60 (1996).
84. Id. at 79.
85. Id.
86. Id. This was the first paragraph out of five. The waiver paragraphs “did not stand out from
the rest of the form,” nor did they “require a separate signature.” Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 79–80.
90. See id. at 84–89.
91. See id. at 81–84.
92. Id. at 86 (emphasis added). “In other words, the notion of ‘freedom of contract’ has been
‘de-emphasized’ in favor of other considerations.” Richard Schuster, Do Liability Waivers Really
Work?, MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C.: BLOG (Sept. 30, 2013), https://www.mwllaw.com/do-liability-waivers-really-work/ [https://perma.cc/BZ87-PMYR].
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signer to the nature and significance of what is being signed.”93 The court held
that the waiver failed both factors, and as a result, the waiver was ruled void as
against public policy.94
The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision to adopt public policy as the
germane analysis95 is the court’s attempt to rectify a messy situation in the
world of exculpatory contracts. Years later, in 2005, the court confirmed that
public policy is the germane analysis in Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness
Center.96
In Atkins, a local physician, Wilson, visited Swimwest for physical
therapy.97 Before entering the facility, Wilson was required to fill out a guest
registration card which contained a “Waiver Release Statement.”98 Without
asking any questions, Wilson signed the card and entered the pool area.99 Soon
thereafter, an employee saw Wilson lying motionless at the bottom of the
pool.100 A Swimwest employee pulled Wilson from the pool and began
administering CPR.101 Wilson died at the hospital the next day.102 The autopsy
indicated the cause of death was drowning.103 Wilson’s only child, Benjamin
Atkins, filed suit for wrongful death.104 In order to clarify Wisconsin’s law
regarding the enforceability of exculpatory contracts, the court of appeals
certified the appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.105
First, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin undertook a “contractual inquiry” to
determine whether the language of the contract covered the activity.106 Because
the language in the contract did cover the activity, the court proceeded to a
93. Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 84.
94. See id. at 89. First, the waiver failed to clearly inform the signer that he was waiving all
claims because the form was absent any language that would indicate “Yauger’s intent to release
Hidden Valley from its own negligence.” Id. at 84. Second, the form failed to communicate the
significance of the form being signed because (a) the form served two purposes; (b) the waiver section
did not stick out; and (c) the waiver section did not require its own signature. Id. at 79, 87.
95. Id. at 86.
96. 2005 WI 4, ¶ 13, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334.
97. Id. ¶ 3.
98. Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
99. Id. ¶ 5.
100. Id. ¶ 7.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. ¶ 8.
105. Id. ¶ 10. Initially, the circuit court held that the form Wilson signed was enforceable, and
thus, protected Swimwest from any liability for Wilson’s death. Id. ¶ 9.
106. See id. ¶ 13.
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public policy analysis, and confirmed that such analysis “remains the ‘germane
analysis’ for exculpatory clauses.”107 However, rather than resolving the
conflicting approaches in Yauger and Richards,108 the court applied factors
from both cases, and held that the exculpatory contract violated public policy.109
The court concluded that: (1) the waiver of liability form was overly broad and
all-inclusive (Richards and Yauger);110 (2) the form served two purposes—
guest registration and waiver of liability (Richards);111 and (3) Wilson did not
have an opportunity to bargain (Richards).112 As a result, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court once again held that the exculpatory language was contrary to
public policy, and thus, unenforceable.113
III. THE CONSISTENT HOLDING: “VOID AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY”
Fast forward to March 2016. In Roberts v. T.H.E. Insurance Company, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court decided its most recent case regarding the
enforceability of exculpatory contracts.114 In this Part, I examine Roberts in
order to illustrate the most recent analysis undertaken by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court when resolving the enforceability of exculpatory contracts. I
then analyze the exculpatory language found in a gym membership contract
located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Applying the analysis the Wisconsin
Supreme Court undertook in Roberts, I determine whether or not the court

107. See id.
108. One scholar has stated that “[t]he majority sidestepped resolving the conflicting approaches
in those two cases” because, under either approach, the contract would violate public policy.
Pendleton, supra note 9, at 18.
109. Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶ 18 (“Applying the factors from Yauger and Richards, we hold that
Swimwest’s exculpatory clause is in violation of public policy.”).
110. Id. ¶ 18–19 (“The language chosen by Swimwest [was] not clear and could potentially bar
any claim arising under any scenario.”); see also Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 84,
557 N.W.2d 60, 63 (1996); Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1017, 513 N.W.2d 118, 122
(1994).
111. Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶ 23 (“Just as in Richards and Yauger, the exculpatory language
appeared to be part of, or a requirement for, a larger registration form.”); see also Richards, 181 Wis.
2d at 1017.
112. Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶ 18. While a Swimwest employee did inform Mrs. Wilson that the
form included a waiver, in addition to Mrs. Wilson being given an opportunity to read the form and
ask questions, “[t]his information alone . . . is not sufficient to demonstrate a bargaining opportunity.
The form itself must provide an opportunity to bargain.” Id. ¶ 25; see also Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at
1019.
113. Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶ 30.
114. See Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492.
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would find the exculpatory language in the gym membership contract
enforceable.
A. Roberts v. T.H.E. Insurance Company
In Roberts, Patti Roberts was injured at a charity event when she was struck
by a hot air balloon while waiting in line for a balloon ride.115 The hot air
balloon was tied to a pick-up truck and two trees.116 The balloon-ride operator
would raise the balloon to the length of the ropes and then lower it back down.117
After Patti and her family got in line for a balloon ride, Sundog Ballooning
(owner and operator of the hot air balloon) gave her a waiver of liability form.118
While Roberts did in fact sign the release form, she did not return it to
Sundog.119 Due to heavy winds, a rope tied to the hot air balloon snapped,
causing the balloon to veer towards the customers waiting in line.120 As a result,
Patti Roberts sustained injuries when she was struck by the hot air balloon’s
basket and knocked to the ground.121
Roberts filed suit against Sundog claiming that the balloon operator’s
negligence caused her injuries.122 Sundog argued, “Roberts read the release,
understood its importance, and understood she was waiving her right to bring a
negligence claim.”123 Additionally, Sundog maintained that Patti Roberts failed
to ask questions and had the opportunity to bargain.124 In the end, the court held
that the liability waiver form was void as against public policy, and thus,
unenforceable.125

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. ¶¶ 5–10.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id.
Id. ¶ 8.
Id. (noting that the signed form was actually found on the ground after Roberts was injured).
Id. ¶ 10.
Id.
Id. ¶ 13. As the court noted,
[t]he evidence submitted to the circuit court demonstrated that defendant Kerry
Hanson, the balloon operator, had limited experience with tethered ballooning
before giving rides at Green Valley’s event. Hanson testified in his deposition
that he should have obtained information regarding weather fronts in the area.
Had he known about the weather front on the day Roberts was injured, Hanson
testified that he would have suspended the ride.

Id. ¶ 11.
123. Id. ¶ 57.
124. Id.
125. See id. ¶ 63.
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In reaching its conclusion, the Wisconsin Supreme Court examined its
previous rulings in Richards, Yauger, and Atkins.126 Again, the court stated,
“[i]f the contract covers the activity, we proceed to a public policy analysis,
‘which remains the “germane analysis” for exculpatory clauses.’”127 Moving
to public policy, the court noted that the Atkins decision adopted a combination
of the factors set forth in both Yauger and Richards.128 Again, the factors set
forth in Atkins included whether: “(1) the waiver was overly broad and allinclusive; (2) the form served two functions and did not provide the signer
adequate notification of the waiver’s nature and significance; and (3) there was
little or no opportunity to bargain or negotiate in regard to the exculpatory
language in question.”129 This time around, the court reached its conclusion
based on the first and third factors.130
First, the exculpatory contract was overly broad and all-inclusive.131 In
finding that the exculpatory contract was overly broad and all-inclusive, the
court examined the following specific provisions:
I expressly, willing, and voluntarily assume full
responsibility for all risks of any and every kind involved with
or arising from my participation in hot air balloon activities
with Company whether during flight preparation, take-off,
flight, landing, travel to or from the take-off or landing areas,
or otherwise.
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, I hereby
irrevocably release Company, its employees, agents,
representatives, contractors, subcontractors, successors, heirs,
assigns, affiliates, and legal representatives (the “Released
Parties”) from, and hold them harmless for, all claims, rights,
demands or causes of action whether known or unknown,
suspected or unsuspected, arising out of the ballooning
activities.132

126. Id. ¶¶ 50–55. “Our prior decisions have also set forth the factors to apply in analyzing
whether a contract is void as a matter of law.” Id. ¶ 50.
127. Id. ¶ 49 (quoting Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, ¶ 13, 277 Wis. 2d
303, 691 N.W.2d 334 (citing Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 86, 557 N.W.2d 60, 64
(1996))).
128. Id. ¶ 55.
129. Id.
130. See id. ¶¶ 59–63.
131. Id. ¶ 59.
132. Id. ¶ 9.
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Additionally, the court addressed the issue of whether Roberts would have
contemplated that the waiver covered waiting in line for a balloon ride.133
Second, Mrs. Roberts had no opportunity to bargain or negotiate,134 given
the fact that she was told, in order to ride the hot air balloon, she must sign the
form.135 Moreover, the court noted that Sundog did not discuss with Roberts:
the content of the waiver; any risk associated with the activity of riding hot air
balloons; or any risks of watching others ride hot air balloons.136 Additionally,
Sundog did not ask if Roberts had any complaints or concerns regarding the
waiver, and therefore, she was given no opportunity to bargain or negotiate the
terms laid out.137
As seen in Roberts, rather than clarifying Wisconsin’s law regarding the
enforceability of exculpatory contracts—as had been requested by the court of
appeals in Atkins138—the Wisconsin Supreme Court has continued to void
exculpatory contracts.139 Furthermore, the court has tailored its analysis to fit
within each case, and has applied different factors to each.140 This type of
analysis exemplifies just how difficult it is for businesses to prevail when
relying on an exculpatory contract.
B. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s Hypothetical Analysis of the
Exculpatory Language Found in a Milwaukee Gym Membership
Agreement
When the New Year hits, millions of people across America begin to make
New Year’s resolutions. For many Americans, that resolution often entails
shedding some unwanted pounds. As a result, consumers will flock to their
local gym eager to achieve their New Year’s goal.141 Nevertheless, before one

133. Id. ¶ 60 (“[I]t is not clear whether waiting in line for the ride is something Roberts would
have contemplated as being covered by the waiver, especially because she was not required to return
the waiver before she got into the line.”).
134. Id. ¶ 61.
135. Id. ¶ 62 (“Roberts was told she would have to sign ‘this document.’” (emphasis added)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, ¶ 10, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d
334.
139. See, e.g., Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 63.
140. Compare id. at ¶¶ 59–63, with Atkins, 2005 WI 4, ¶¶ 18–19, and Yauger v. Skiing Enters.,
Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 78, 557 N.W.2d 60, 61 (1996), and Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007,
1016, 513 N.W.2d 118, 122 (1994).
141. Oliver St. John, Can Gyms Retain New Year’s Resolution Members?, USA TODAY (Jan.
16, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2013/01/16/gyms-new-years-
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may dive into his or her new workout routine, many gyms require consumers
to fill out gym membership contracts.142 However, given the status of
Wisconsin’s current law regarding exculpatory contracts, recreational business
owners, specifically gym owners (for purposes of this Section), cannot safely
rely upon exculpatory language or release waivers in order to avoid liability.143
Using the analysis undertaken in Roberts, in this Section I examine a
Milwaukee gym membership contract,144 and evaluate whether or not a
Wisconsin court would find the exculpatory language in the contract
enforceable. In order to create a hypothetical lawsuit, I take facts from a recent
case heard by California’s Court of Appeal.145
In this “hypothetical” case, a gym member fell backwards off of a moving
treadmill and hit her head on the steel foot of an exercise machine,146 and, as a
result of the fall, sustained severe head injuries.147 The machine upon which
the member hit her head was placed nearly four feet behind the treadmill.148
Consequently, the gym member filed a lawsuit claiming the gym was negligent
in its set up of the treadmill.149 The gym maintains it is free from liability
because the member had signed a waiver of liability form.150 In response, the
member argues that the waiver should be found unenforceable because it
violates public policy.151

resolution-rush/1779651/ [https://perma.cc/9FS8-RLRP] (citing a survey that found “over 12% of new
gym members join in January alone”).
142. See, e.g., Gold’s Gym Membership Agreement (Jan. 12, 2017) [hereinafter Milwaukee
Gym Membership Agreement] (on file with author); FTX Crossfit Membership Agreement, FTX
CROSSFIT,
http://ftxcrossfit.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/FTXMembershipAgreement1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J3R3-58U5] (last visited Jan. 3, 2018); Life Gym, L.L.C. Membership Agreement,
LIFE
GYM,
https://www.lifegymok.com/files/Revised%20Life%20Gym%20Membership.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z23A-RF2Q] (last visited Jan. 3, 2018).
143. See generally Bruett, supra note 2 (addressing the issue of whether a reasonable business
can safely rely upon exculpatory contracts to limit liability).
144. Milwaukee Gym Membership Agreement, supra note 142.
145. Jimenez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 228 (Ct. App. 2015).
146. Id. at 231.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 231–32 (noting that the treadmill’s owner’s manual states that “[t]he minimum space
requirement needed for user safety and proper maintenance is three feet wide by six feet
deep . . . directly behind the running belt”).
150. Id. at 231.
151. In Jiminez itself, the plaintiff actually argued that the release was “invalid because [the gym]
was grossly negligent and because [the gym] obtained the release through fraud.” Id. at 233.
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Applying the framework in Roberts, the court would first determine
whether the language of the contract covered the activity.152 Because the
language in the contract does cover the activity,153 the court would then proceed
to the germane analysis for exculpatory contracts—public policy.154 Case law
has detailed factors to apply when analyzing whether a contract is void as
against public policy.155 Similar to Roberts, the court here would likely find
the waiver of liability void as against public policy “because it fails to satisfy
the factors set forth in [its] prior case law.”156 Specifically, the court would
examine two factors.
First, the gym’s liability waiver is likely too broad and all-inclusive.157 As
mentioned previously, “[a]n exculpatory agreement will be held to contravene
public policy if it is so broad ‘that it would absolve [the defendant] from any
injury to the [plaintiff] for any reason.’”158 Analogous to Roberts, the waiver
of liability here would “absolve [the Milwaukee gym] . . . for any reason.”159
The waiver states:
Member voluntarily agrees to assume all risks of personal
injury to Member, Member’s spouse, children, unborn
children, other family members, guests or invitees and waives
any and all claims or actions Member may have against [the
Gym], any of its subsidiaries or other affiliates and any of their
respective officers, directors, employees, agents, successors
and assigns for any such personal injury (and no such person
shall be liable to Member, Member’s spouse, children, unborn
children, other family members, guests or invitees for any such
personal injury), including, without limitation [injuries that

152. See Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, ¶ 49, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492.
153. See Milwaukee Gym Membership Agreement, supra note 142 (“Member voluntarily agrees
to assume all risks of personal injury to Member . . . and waives any and all claims or actions that
Member may have against [this] Gym . . . for any such personal injury . . . including, without
limitation . . . injuries arising from use of any exercise equipment.”).
154. See Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 49.
155. See id. ¶ 50. Factors the court will consider include: (1) whether the waiver is overly broad
and all-inclusive; (2) whether the form serves two functions and does not provide the signer adequate
notification of the waiver’s nature and significance; and (3) whether there is little or no opportunity to
bargain or negotiate in regard to the exculpatory language in question. See, e.g., Richards v. Richards,
181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1017–19, 513 N.W.2d 118, 122–23 (1994).
156. Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 58.
157. See Milwaukee Gym Membership Agreement, supra note 142.
158. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1015 (alterations in original) (quoting Coll. Mobile Home Park &
Sales, Inc. v. Hoffmann, 72 Wis. 2d 514, 521–22, 241 N.W.2d 174, 178 (1976)).
159. Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 60.
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result from various types of gym activities].160
Second, the form serves two functions and is not clearly identified. The
form functions as the Membership Agreement as well as the Waiver of Liability
form.161 This dual function was not clearly identified in the title,162 as the title
of the form states “Membership Agreement.” The only sort of notice offered is
a statement near the bottom of the form which reads, “Notice: See other side
for important information.”163 A court would not likely give this fact much
significance. Throughout the first page of the Membership Agreement, the
member is required to initial or sign next to sections regarding items such as
monthly dues and consent to receive telemarketing calls and texts.164
Nonetheless, the member is not required to initial or sign next to the Waiver of
Liability section.165 Thus, the Membership Agreement fails to clearly
distinguish between the dual functions.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s analysis in Roberts, as well as its
application to a given set of facts, as illustrated above, demonstrates just how
difficult it is for businesses to prevail when relying on an exculpatory contract.
Additionally, the court’s eventual adoption of public policy as the germane
analysis underscores the court’s broad discretion when resolving the
enforceability of exculpatory contracts.166 This near impossibility to find an
enforceable exculpatory contract has left scholars and practicing attorneys
begging the question whether a business can safely rely upon exculpatory
contracts.167

160. Milwaukee Gym Membership Agreement, supra note 142 (emphasis added).
161. See id.
162. See Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1017, for an analysis of this requirement. In Richards, the
form was titled “Passenger Authorization,” yet functioned as both (1) an authorization form to allow
passengers to ride in a company vehicle and (2) a release of liability form. Id.
163. Milwaukee Gym Membership Agreement, supra note 142.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, ¶ 49, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492;
Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, ¶ 13, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334; Yauger
v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 86, 557 N.W.2d 60, 64 (1996).
167. See Timothy Fenner, Waivers of Liability: Are They Worth the Paper They Are Written
On?, AXLEY BRYNELSON (May 30, 2013), https://www.axley.com/publication_article/waivers-ofliability-are-they-worth-the-paper-they-are-written-on/ [https://perma.cc/AVL4-UYFS]; Schuster, Do
Liability Waivers Really Work?, supra note 92; Richard Schuster, The Wisconsin Supreme Court
Weighs in Again on Liability Waivers, MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C.: BLOG (Oct. 25, 2016),
https://www.mwl-law.com/wisconsin-supreme-court-weighs-liability-waivers/
[https://perma.cc/R4BT-BXQZ]; see also Bruett, supra note 2, at 1098 (“[U]nder the current approach
taken by Wisconsin courts, businesses cannot safely rely upon these agreements.”).

NOLD - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 2 (FINAL 2.7.18).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

2/24/18 1:08 PM

CODIFY THIS

593

IV. STATUTORY PROTECTION
While the Wisconsin Supreme Court has yet to uphold an exculpatory
contract since 1982,168 the ski industry can breathe a sigh of relief. On February
29, 2016, the Wisconsin Legislature enacted Wisconsin Act 168.169 The
purpose of the act was to repeal, amend, renumber, and create statutes170 related
to the “duties of ski area operators and persons who bike in a ski area, and
liability of ski area operators.”171 In this Part, I examine this Act more closely,
demonstrating that ski resorts no longer have a need for exculpatory contracts.
Additionally, I run a quick survey of various ski resorts, which will verify
whether these ski resorts are taking advantage of the statutory protection.
Finally, I briefly return to the case Roberts v. T.H.E. Insurance Company, which
will demonstrate the court’s willingness to grant statutory protection when
applicable, and thus, eliminate the need for customers to sign exculpatory
contracts.
A. Wisconsin Statutes Section 167.33—Alpine Sports
Wisconsin Statutes sections 167.33(3) and 167.33(4) impose certain duties
upon ski area operators and ski area owners.172 Under section 167.33(3)(a), the
first duty imposed upon a ski area operator is to print a warning notice on each
ticket issued to participants.173 Sections 167.33(3)(b) through 167.33(3)(j) lay
out various requirements concerning signage.174 These requirements specify:
(1) the exact language of what each sign should contain; (2) the dimensions of
the signs; and (3) the location(s) of where the signs need to be placed.175
168. See Pendleton, supra note 9, at 17; see also Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, 367
Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492.
169. 2015 Wis. Act 168.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. WIS. STAT. §§ 167.33(3)–(4) (2015–2016).
173. Id. § 167.33(3)(a) (“WARNING: Under Wisconsin law, each participant in an alpine sport
assumes the risk of injury or death to person or injury to property resulting from the conditions and
risks that are considered to be inherent in an alpine sport, has a number of duties that must be met while
engaging in an alpine sport, and is subject to limitations on the ability to recover damages from a ski
area operator for injuries or death to a person or to property. A complete copy of this law is available
for review at the main site where tickets to this ski area are sold.”).
174. See id. §§ 167.33(3)–(j).
175. Id. § 167.33(3)(b). This section states, in part:
Each ski area operator shall post and maintain the following signs:
1. A sign that is at least 10 square feet in size at or near each of the sites where
tickets to the ski area are sold, at or near each of the entrances or lift loading areas
for areas that are open to alpine sports, and at or near each area open to sledding,
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Moreover, Wisconsin Statutes section 167.33(4) sets out other various duties
for ski owners.176 Specifically, section 167.33(4)(c) requires a qualified lift
inspector177 to perform annual lift inspections.178
The substance of Wisconsin Act 168, however, is the amendment to
Wisconsin Statutes section 895.526(4)(a). This section states:
A ski operator who fulfills all of his or her duties under
[subsections] 167.33 (3) and (4) owes no further duty of care
to a participant in an alpine sport and is not liable for an injury
or death that occurs as a result of any condition or risk accepted
by the participant under [subsection] (2).179
This statute finally provides a means to escape exculpatory contracts, yet a
foolproof mechanism to ensure protection from liability. Now, think back to
Dobratz v. Thomson.180 In that case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
[A]lthough we do not intend to create a “magic words” rule,
we consider that it would be very helpful for such contracts to
set forth in clear and express terms that the party signing it is
releasing others for their negligent acts or, where the contract
includes an assumption of risk clause, is assuming the risk of
biking, or tubing which is not served by a lift. The sign shall contain the following
warning:
WARNING—ASSUMPTION OF RISKS: Under Wisconsin law, each
participant in an alpine sport is considered to have accepted and to have
knowledge of the risk of injury or death to person or injury to property that may
result. Under Wisconsin law, each participant in an alpine sport has the duty to
take the precautions that are necessary to avoid injury or death to person or injury
to property. Wisconsin law sets forth certain other limitations on the liability of
ski area operators for injuries or death to person or injury to property. A complete
copy of this law is available for review at the main site where tickets to this ski
area are sold.
Id.
176. See id. § 167.33(4).
177. Under section 167.33(4)(d), a qualified lift inspector means:
1. An individual authorized by the department of safety and professional
services to make inspections of lifts pursuant to ch. 101.
2. An individual who has knowledge of the requirements of the rules specified
in par. (c) and of the design and operation of lifts and who has one of the
following:
a. A degree of engineering from a recognized university.
b. Experience as an inspector of lifts for an insurance company that has
provided liability insurance coverage to any ski area.
Id. § 167.33(4)(d).
178. Id. § 167.33(4)(c).
179. Id. § 895.526(4)(a).
180. 161 Wis. 2d 502, 468 N.W.2d 654 (1991).
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harm caused by the negligent acts of others.181
For years the Wisconsin Supreme Court has evolved its analysis regarding
exculpatory contracts, yet has failed to offer any sort of concrete guidance on
how to draft an enforceable agreement.182 However, with the enactment of
Wisconsin Act 168, the legislature has created those “magic words,” and as a
result, ski resorts essentially have a checklist,183 fulfillment of which enables
them to escape liability, and thus, eliminates the need for its participants to sign
an exculpatory agreement.
B. Survey: Are Wisconsin Ski Resorts Still Using Release Forms?
This nonexhaustive survey is intended to reveal whether ski resorts in
Wisconsin have moved away from the no-longer-needed release agreements
per Wisconsin Statutes section 895.526(4)(a). After examining three different
ski resorts, I found that only one resort has completely abandoned exculpatory
agreements. Both Granite Peak184 and Grand Geneva185 still require
participants to fill out release of liability forms. On the other hand, Alpine
Valley Resort no longer requires participants to fill out a release of liability
form.186
While this may seem surprising or even somewhat discouraging, one should
keep a few things in perspective. Wisconsin Act 168 was enacted February 29,
2016 and the effective date was March 2, 2016.187 Accordingly, as of the time
of this publication, the statutory amendments have not even been in place for
two years. More importantly, a possible reason these resorts still “rely” on the

181. Id. at 525 (emphasis added).
182. See, e.g., Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492; Atkins
v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334; Yauger v. Skiing
Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 557 N.W.2d 60 (1996); Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 513
N.W.2d 118 (1994); Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 502; Disc. Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. Wis. Tel. Co.,
117 Wis. 2d 587, 345 N.W.2d 417 (1984); Arnold v. Shawano Cty. Agric. Socʹy, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 330
N.W.2d 773 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304,
401 N.W.2d 816 (1987); Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 321 N.W.2d 173 (1982).
183. See generally 2015 Wis. Act 168.
184. Releases
and
Waivers,
GRANITE
PEAK,
https://www.skigranitepeak.com/contactUs/releasesWaivers.cfm
[https://perma.cc/4G8C-ZMLC]
(last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
185. Release of Liability: Ski, GRAND GENEVA, http://www.grandgeneva.com/pdf-lake-genevavacation/documents/release_of_liability.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MRF-C4YK] (last visited Sept. 29,
2017).
186. See Documents/Forms, ALPINE VALLEY RESORT, http://www.alpinevalleyresort.com/theresort/documents/ [https://perma.cc/YP2D-XBMQ] (last visited Sept. 29, 2017).
187. 2015 Wis. Act 168.
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use of exculpatory agreements is to keep insurance premiums down.188 In
return, the ski resort is able to offer rental tickets and equipment at a reduced
price.189 Whatever the case may be, as evidenced by Alpine Valley Resort, the
ski industry seems to be moving away from exculpatory contracts and relying
on the statutory protection.
C. Wisconsin Statutes Section 895.52—Recreational Activities; Limitation of
Property Owners’ Liability
Before the court in Roberts resolved the issue concerning the waiver of
liability form, the court answered the question of whether or not Sundog was
entitled to immunity under Wisconsin Statutes section 895.52.190 This
recreational immunity statute protects property owners from potential liability
when they open their lands to the public.191 In Roberts, Sundog argued that
section 895.52 was applicable, and as a result, should have been entitled to
immunity.192
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, held that Sundog was not entitled
to the recreational immunity under the statute because “Sundog . . . [was] not
an owner under the statute . . . and the hot air balloon was not ‘property’ because

188. See, e.g., Disc. Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. Wis. Tel. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 587, 599–600,
345 N.W.2d 417, 423 (1984) (“This exculpatory clause may have kept the company’s insurance
premiums down.”).
189. See Bruett, supra note 2, at 1081.
190. Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, ¶ 47, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492. If the
Wisconsin Supreme Court did in fact find that Sundog was entitled to the recreational immunity under
section 895.52, the court would not have even addressed the waiver of liability form at issue.
191. Id. ¶ 28; see also WIS. STAT. § 895.52 (2015–2016). Section 895.52(2) states:
(2) NO DUTY; IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY.
(a) Except as provided in [subsections] (3) to (6), no owner and no officer,
employee or agent of an owner owes to any person who enters the owner’s
property to engage in a recreational activity:
1. A duty to keep the property safe for recreational activities.
2. A duty to inspect the property, except as provided under [section]
23.115(2).
3. A duty to give warning of an unsafe condition, use or activity on the
property.
(b) Except as provided in [subsections] (3) to (6), no owner and no officer,
employee or agent of an owner is liable for the death of, any injury to, or any
death or injury caused by, a person engaging in a recreational activity on the
owner’s property.
Id. § 895.52(2)(a)–(b).
192. Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶ 29.
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it [was] not a ‘structure.’”193 While the court in Roberts did not grant
recreational immunity to Sundog, the court did cite to cases in which the
defendant was entitled to immunity under section 895.52.194 This suggests the
court’s willingness to grant statutory protection when applicable. Thus, had
Sundog been protected under the statute, the need for Patti Roberts to sign the
waiver of liability form would have been eliminated.
V. A STATUTE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION: THE SOLUTION
Nearly nineteen years ago, a Marquette Law School student, Keith Bruett,
wrote a comment questioning whether businesses could safely rely upon
exculpatory contracts to limit their liability.195 Well, fast-forward to present
day, and you will find that the Wisconsin Supreme Court has made it nearly
impossible to draft an enforceable exculpatory contract, causing many
Wisconsin-practicing attorneys to ask the same question.196 So, if Wisconsin
businesses cannot safely rely upon exculpatory contracts to limit their liability,
what is the solution?
In that same article written nineteen years ago, Bruett suggested that the
best solution lies in the hands of the legislature.197 He proposed two different
options, both of which called for legislative action: (1) completely ban the use
of exculpatory contracts or (2) codify the requirements for the use of
exculpatory contracts.198 Of the two options, Bruett seemed to favor the
codification of requirements when drafting an exculpatory contract.199
However, as he correctly noted, codifying requirements regarding exculpatory
contracts “would not preclude a reviewing court from invalidating an
exculpatory agreement that contravenes public policy.”200

193. Id. ¶ 46. Under section 895.52, owner means “[a] person, including a governmental body
or nonprofit organization, that owns, leases or occupies property.” WIS. STAT. § 895.52(1)(d).
194. Roberts, 2016 WI 20, ¶¶ 28–32; see, e.g., Hall v. Turtle Lake Lions Club, 146 Wis. 2d 486,
487, 431 N.W.2d 696, 697 (Ct. App. 1988); Weina v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 179 Wis. 2d 774, 776, 508
N.W.2d 67, 68 (Ct. App. 1993).
195. Bruett, supra note 2.
196. See Fenner, supra note 167; see also Schuster, Do Liability Waivers Really Work?, supra
note 92.
197. Bruett, supra note 2, at 1098.
198. Id. at 1098–99.
199. Id. (“While [prohibiting the use of exculpatory contracts] would provide certainty, the cost
to businesses would be greater liability exposure and higher insurance premiums. Rather than bear
these costs, businesses would likely pass these costs onto the consumer [which] may nevertheless
adversely affect businesses if escalating costs kept patrons away.”).
200. Id. at 1099.
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While I too believe legislative action is the correct solution, the best
approach is to follow the blueprint already created by the legislature, such as
the blueprint found in sections 167.33 and 895.526(4)(a).201 This approach
eliminates the need for exculpatory contracts, all the while affording
recreational businesses the necessary protection.202 This solution takes an
already highly regulated recreational business, like snow skiing,203 and codifies
safety requirements.204 If the recreational business satisfies all the requirements
within the statute, then the business owes no further duty to its customers. As
a result, the statute eliminates the need to use exculpatory contracts.
Moreover, codifying safety requirements for recreational businesses, and
thus, eliminating the need for exculpatory contracts, also eradicates the broad
discretion used by the Wisconsin Supreme Court when analyzing an
exculpatory contract under public policy grounds. Under this proposal, when a
party brings a negligence claim against a recreational business, the court’s
analysis will now consist of checking whether the business has satisfied all the
requirements set out in the statute. If the business fails to satisfy all the statutory
requirements, and as a result the consumer is injured, the court will hold the
recreational business liable for such injuries. However, if the business has
satisfied all the statutory requirements, the recreational business will be
afforded the liability protection under the statute.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the current status of Wisconsin’s law regarding exculpatory
contracts, recreational businesses cannot safely rely upon exculpatory language
or release waivers in order to limit liability. The court’s ability to use broad
discretion under the public policy analysis has led to the consistent holding:
void as against public policy.205 Codifying safety requirements for recreational

201. See WIS. STAT. §§ 167.33(3)–(4), 895.526 (2015–2016).
202. See generally id.
203. See
generally
Safety
Programs,
NATIONAL SKI AREA ASSOCIATION,
http://www.nsaa.org/safety-programs/ [https://perma.cc/5MJL-6588] (last visited Jan. 9, 2018); NSAA
Ski
Lift
Safety
Fact
Sheet,
NATIONAL
SKI
AREA
ASSOCIATION,
http://www.nsaa.org/media/310500/Lift_Safety_Fact_Sheet_2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/27543WM6] (last visited Jan. 9, 2018).
204. See WIS. STAT. §§ 167.33(3)–(4), 895.526(4).
205. See, e.g., Roberts v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 20, 367 Wis. 2d 386, 879 N.W.2d 492; Atkins
v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334; Yauger v. Skiing
Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 557 N.W.2d 60 (1996); Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 513
N.W.2d 118 (1994); Disc. Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. Wis. Tel. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 587, 345 N.W.2d
417 (1984); Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 321 N.W.2d 173 (1982).
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businesses will eliminate the court’s broad discretion. Additionally, those
recreational businesses that abide by the applicable requirements will be
afforded statutory protection against potential liability. Moreover, the new
statutory requirements will strive to ensure safety to those consumers who
choose to participate in the recreational activity.
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